that the securities and credit intermediation, subsectors of fi nance are responsible that the securities and credit intermediation, subsectors of fi nance are responsible for the acceleration of fi nancial sector growth since 1980; insurance, by contrast, for the acceleration of fi nancial sector growth since 1980; insurance, by contrast, has grown at a steady pace since the 1940s. has grown at a steady pace since the 1940s.
The growth of the fi nancial sector is also evident in the growth of fi nancial The growth of the fi nancial sector is also evident in the growth of fi nancial claims and contracts, including stocks, bonds, derivatives, and mutual fund shares. claims and contracts, including stocks, bonds, derivatives, and mutual fund shares. Drawing on the Flow of Funds Accounts published by the Federal Reserve, the value Drawing on the Flow of Funds Accounts published by the Federal Reserve, the value of total fi nancial assets was approximately fi ve times US GDP in 1980; by 2007, this of total fi nancial assets was approximately fi ve times US GDP in 1980; by 2007, this ratio had doubled. Over the same period, the ratio of fi nancial assets to tangible ratio had doubled. Over the same period, the ratio of fi nancial assets to tangible assets (like plant and equipment, land, and residential structures) increased as well. assets (like plant and equipment, land, and residential structures) increased as well. This growth was not simply the continuation of a trend that started in the 1950s; This growth was not simply the continuation of a trend that started in the 1950s; rather, something appears to have changed in the early 1980s. rather, something appears to have changed in the early 1980s.
The US economy was not the only one to experience dramatic growth in fi nanThe US economy was not the only one to experience dramatic growth in fi nancial services. Other than the relatively small economy of Switzerland, where fi nancial cial services. Other than the relatively small economy of Switzerland, where fi nancial services play an outsized role, there is a group of English-speaking countries includservices play an outsized role, there is a group of English-speaking countries including the United States, Great Britain, and Canada that stand out for the share of their ing the United States, Great Britain, and Canada that stand out for the share of their economy devoted to fi nance. economy devoted to fi nance.
Workers in the fi nancial sector have shared impressively in this growth: in 1980, Workers in the fi nancial sector have shared impressively in this growth: in 1980, the typical fi nancial services employee earned about the same wages as his counterthe typical fi nancial services employee earned about the same wages as his counterpart in other industries; by 2006, employees in fi nancial services earned an average part in other industries; by 2006, employees in fi nancial services earned an average
Figure 1
The Growth of Financial Services (value added share of GDP) Source : Authors' calculations using data from National Income and Product Accounts ) and the National Economic Accounts (1929 -1947) . Notes: The fi nance sector includes the insurance, securities, and credit intermediation subsectors. The securities subsector includes the activities typically associated with investment banks and asset management fi rms, and it comprises two different categories in later sample years ("Securities" and "Funds, trusts, and other vehicles"); we combine them into one category for consistency. Graduates from the Stanford MBA program who entered fi nancial services during the 1990s earned more than three times the who entered fi nancial services during the 1990s earned more than three times the wages of their classmates who entered other industries (Oyer 2008 ). wages of their classmates who entered other industries (Oyer 2008) .
Has society benefi ted from the recent growth of the fi nancial sector? There Has society benefi ted from the recent growth of the fi nancial sector? There is a large literature dating back at least to Schumpeter (1911) that sees a vibrant is a large literature dating back at least to Schumpeter (1911) that sees a vibrant fi nancial sector as critical to capital allocation and economic growth. Seminal fi nancial sector as critical to capital allocation and economic growth. Seminal empirical contributions include Goldsmith (1969) , King and Levine (1993) , and empirical contributions include Goldsmith (1969) , King and Levine (1993) , and Rajan and Zingales (1998) , which document the relationship between fi nancial Rajan and Zingales (1998) , which document the relationship between fi nancial development and growth in cross-country studies. It is natural to think therefore development and growth in cross-country studies. It is natural to think therefore that the more recent period of fi nancial development has also been economithat the more recent period of fi nancial development has also been economically benefi cial. Yet, many are skeptical about its value, particularly in light of the cally benefi cial. Yet, many are skeptical about its value, particularly in light of the recent fi nancial crisis. Indeed, Rajan (2005) , whose research has emphasized recent fi nancial crisis. Indeed, Rajan (2005) , whose research has emphasized the value of fi nancial development, famously called into question the value of the value of fi nancial development, famously called into question the value of more recent fi nancial sector growth at a symposium of central bankers just before more recent fi nancial sector growth at a symposium of central bankers just before the fi nancial crisis erupted. And Adair Turner (2010) , the top fi nancial regulator the fi nancial crisis erupted. And Adair Turner (2010) , the top fi nancial regulator in the UK, has written: "There is no clear evidence that the growth in the scale in the UK, has written: "There is no clear evidence that the growth in the scale and complexity of the fi nancial system in the rich developed world over the last 20 and complexity of the fi nancial system in the rich developed world over the last 20 to 30 years has driven increased growth or stability, and it is possible for fi nancial to 30 years has driven increased growth or stability, and it is possible for fi nancial activity to extract rents from the real economy rather than to deliver economic activity to extract rents from the real economy rather than to deliver economic value." Similarly, Philippon (2012; see also Phillipon and Reshef in this issue) value." Similarly, Philippon (2012; see also Phillipon and Reshef in this issue) argues that the period of recent growth has come with a puzzling increase in the argues that the period of recent growth has come with a puzzling increase in the cost of fi nancial intermediation. cost of fi nancial intermediation.
In this paper, we try to shed light on these competing perspectives by fi rst docuIn this paper, we try to shed light on these competing perspectives by fi rst documenting the ways in which fi nance changed during the period from 1980 to 2007. menting the ways in which fi nance changed during the period from 1980 to 2007. We take this approach because surprisingly little is known about which activities We take this approach because surprisingly little is known about which activities contributed to the rapid growth of the fi nancial sector. With a better understanding contributed to the rapid growth of the fi nancial sector. With a better understanding of how the fi nancial sector changed, we provide some perspectives on the social of how the fi nancial sector changed, we provide some perspectives on the social benefi ts and costs of fi nancial sector growth. benefi ts and costs of fi nancial sector growth.
Our main fi nding is that much of the growth of fi nance is associated with Our main fi nding is that much of the growth of fi nance is associated with two activities: asset management and the provision of household credit. The value two activities: asset management and the provision of household credit. The value of fi nancial assets under professional management grew dramatically, with the of fi nancial assets under professional management grew dramatically, with the total fees charged to manage these assets growing at approximately the same pace. total fees charged to manage these assets growing at approximately the same pace. A large part of this growth came from the increase in the value of fi nancial assets, A large part of this growth came from the increase in the value of fi nancial assets, which was itself driven largely by an increase in stock market valuations (such as the which was itself driven largely by an increase in stock market valuations (such as the price/earnings multiples). There was also enormous growth in household credit, price/earnings multiples). There was also enormous growth in household credit, from 48 percent of GDP in 1980 to 99 percent in 2007. Most of this growth was in from 48 percent of GDP in 1980 to 99 percent in 2007. Most of this growth was in residential mortgages. Consumer debt (auto, credit card, and student loans) also residential mortgages. Consumer debt (auto, credit card, and student loans) also grew, and a signifi cant fraction of mortgage debt took the form of home equity grew, and a signifi cant fraction of mortgage debt took the form of home equity lines used to fund consumption (Mian and Sufi 2012). The increase in household lines used to fund consumption (Mian and Sufi 2012). The increase in household credit contributed to the growth of the fi nancial sector mainly through fees on loan credit contributed to the growth of the fi nancial sector mainly through fees on loan origination, underwriting of asset-backed securities, trading and management of origination, underwriting of asset-backed securities, trading and management of fi xed income products, and derivatives trading. fi xed income products, and derivatives trading.
Thus, any assessment of whether and in what ways society benefi ted from the Thus, any assessment of whether and in what ways society benefi ted from the growth of the fi nancial sector depends in large part on an evaluation of professional growth of the fi nancial sector depends in large part on an evaluation of professional asset management and the increase in household credit. In our view, the professionasset management and the increase in household credit. In our view, the professionalization of asset management brought signifi cant benefi ts. The main benefi t was that alization of asset management brought signifi cant benefi ts. The main benefi t was that it facilitated an increase in fi nancial market participation and diversifi cation, which it facilitated an increase in fi nancial market participation and diversifi cation, which likely lowered the cost of capital to corporations. Young fi rms benefi ted in particular, likely lowered the cost of capital to corporations. Young fi rms benefi ted in particular, both because they are more reliant on external fi nancing and because their value both because they are more reliant on external fi nancing and because their value depends more on the cost of capital. At the same time, the cost of professional asset depends more on the cost of capital. At the same time, the cost of professional asset management has been persistently high. While the high price encourages more active management has been persistently high. While the high price encourages more active asset management, it may not result in the kind of active asset management that asset management, it may not result in the kind of active asset management that leads to more informative securities prices or better monitoring of management. It leads to more informative securities prices or better monitoring of management. It also generates economic rents that could draw more resources to the industry than is also generates economic rents that could draw more resources to the industry than is socially desirable. socially desirable.
While greater access to credit has arguably improved the ability of households While greater access to credit has arguably improved the ability of households to smooth consumption, it has also made it easier for many households to overinto smooth consumption, it has also made it easier for many households to overinvest in housing and consume in excess of sustainable levels. This increase in credit vest in housing and consume in excess of sustainable levels. This increase in credit was facilitated by the growth of "shadow banking," whereby many different types of was facilitated by the growth of "shadow banking," whereby many different types of nonbank fi nancial entities performed some of the essential functions of traditional nonbank fi nancial entities performed some of the essential functions of traditional banking, but in a less-stable way. The fi nancial crisis that erupted late in 2007 and banking, but in a less-stable way. The fi nancial crisis that erupted late in 2007 and proved so costly to the economy was largely a crisis in shadow banking. proved so costly to the economy was largely a crisis in shadow banking.
To develop these points we follow the US Bureau of Economic Analysis in To develop these points we follow the US Bureau of Economic Analysis in breaking out the fi nancial services sector into two subsectors: "securities" and "credit breaking out the fi nancial services sector into two subsectors: "securities" and "credit intermediation." We do not consider insurance, the other main subsector of fi nanintermediation." We do not consider insurance, the other main subsector of fi nancial services, because its steady growth is less of a puzzle. cial services, because its steady growth is less of a puzzle. 2 2 The securities subsector (or The securities subsector (or "industry" in the terminology of the BEA) includes the activities typically associated "industry" in the terminology of the BEA) includes the activities typically associated with investment banks (such as Goldman Sachs) and asset management fi rms (such with investment banks (such as Goldman Sachs) and asset management fi rms (such as Fidelity). These activities include securities trading and market making, securias Fidelity). These activities include securities trading and market making, securities underwriting, and asset management for individual and institutional investors. ties underwriting, and asset management for individual and institutional investors. The credit intermediation industry performs the activities typically associated with The credit intermediation industry performs the activities typically associated with traditional banking-lending to consumers and corporations, deposit taking, and traditional banking-lending to consumers and corporations, deposit taking, and processing fi nancial transactions. After describing what drove the growth of these processing fi nancial transactions. After describing what drove the growth of these industries over the course of the 1980-2007 period, we evaluate the benefi ts and industries over the course of the 1980-2007 period, we evaluate the benefi ts and costs of this growth. costs of this growth. 2 Changes in the value added of insurance since 1980 have been driven mainly by a slight decline in life insurance revenues as a percentage of GDP and increases in property and casualty insurance and private health insurance. Property and casualty insurance tends to grow mechanically with the stock of tangible assets, as households insure more automobiles and larger and more expensive houses. The growth of private health insurance, while important for many reasons, is driven by factors outside the scope of this article.
The Growth of the Securities Industry
Components of Growth Figure 1 shows that the growth of the securities industry accounts for almost Figure 1 shows that the growth of the securities industry accounts for almost half the overall (3 percentage point) growth of the fi nancial sector relative to GDP half the overall (3 percentage point) growth of the fi nancial sector relative to GDP from 1980-2007. In particular, the securities industry grew from 0. 4 To get a better sense of the components of growth within the securities To get a better sense of the components of growth within the securities industry, ideally we would break out value added by activity. Unfortunately, there are industry, ideally we would break out value added by activity. Unfortunately, there are no published data on the input costs at the activity-level needed to calculate value no published data on the input costs at the activity-level needed to calculate value added. Instead, we use data on the output of the various activities of the securities added. Instead, we use data on the output of the various activities of the securities industry. This output measure, calculated by the US Bureau of Economic Analysis industry. This output measure, calculated by the US Bureau of Economic Analysis for 1997 and 2002 and the US Census Bureau for 2007, is essentially the revenues of for 1997 and 2002 and the US Census Bureau for 2007, is essentially the revenues of each of the activities of the industry. Detailed breakdowns are only available in these each of the activities of the industry. Detailed breakdowns are only available in these years. Later in this section we will discuss our own estimates of activity-level outputs years. Later in this section we will discuss our own estimates of activity-level outputs for the complete 1980-2007 period. For the remainder of the paper, we focus more for the complete 1980-2007 period. For the remainder of the paper, we focus more on industry output rather than on value added. on industry output rather than on value added.
As Table 1 shows, in 2007, securities industry output was $676.1 billion, while As Table 1 shows, in 2007, securities industry output was $676.1 billion, while value added was $241.2 billion. Asset management was by far the largest component value added was $241.2 billion. Asset management was by far the largest component of output, totaling $341.9 billion, well over four times its level in 1997. What we call of output, totaling $341.9 billion, well over four times its level in 1997. What we call asset management "output" includes fees from investment advisory and manageasset management "output" includes fees from investment advisory and management services (the largest component), the administration of mutual and pension ment services (the largest component), the administration of mutual and pension funds, and trust and custody services. funds, and trust and custody services. Table 1 shows that three revenue sources traditionally associated with invest- Table 1 shows that three revenue sources traditionally associated with investment banking-trading fees and commissions, trading gains, and securities ment banking-trading fees and commissions, trading gains, and securities underwriting fees-fell as a percentage of GDP between 1997 and 2007. These underwriting fees-fell as a percentage of GDP between 1997 and 2007. These declines occurred despite a fourfold increase in stock-market trading. At the same declines occurred despite a fourfold increase in stock-market trading. At the same time, two other activities grew substantially: brokering and dealing in debt products time, two other activities grew substantially: brokering and dealing in debt products with 2007 output of $36 billion, and derivatives trading with output of $45 billion. with 2007 output of $36 billion, and derivatives trading with output of $45 billion. Most of the revenues from derivatives trading appear to be associated with fi xed Most of the revenues from derivatives trading appear to be associated with fi xed income products, and as such, can be understood as a by-product of the growth of income products, and as such, can be understood as a by-product of the growth of credit intermediation, which we discuss in the next section. credit intermediation, which we discuss in the next section. 3 3 In 1997, the derivatives In 1997, the derivatives category was not even reported, suggesting that it was not signifi cant enough to category was not even reported, suggesting that it was not signifi cant enough to warrant its own category. warrant its own category.
Panning Back to 1980
Because the Bureau of Economic Analysis does not provide detailed activityBecause the Bureau of Economic Analysis does not provide detailed activitylevel data prior to 1997, we use a variety of sources to break out securities industry level data prior to 1997, we use a variety of sources to break out securities industry output back to 1980. Figure 2 shows annual estimates of the revenues from several key output back to 1980. Figure 2 shows annual estimates of the revenues from several key activities: traditional asset management (mutual funds, pension funds, and exchangeactivities: traditional asset management (mutual funds, pension funds, and exchangetraded funds), alternative asset management (hedge funds, private equity, and venture traded funds), alternative asset management (hedge funds, private equity, and venture capital), and a variety of broker-dealer activities (underwriting, customer trading, and capital), and a variety of broker-dealer activities (underwriting, customer trading, and proprietary trading). Although our estimates are imperfect and these categories do proprietary trading). Although our estimates are imperfect and these categories do not correspond exactly to the product line outputs shown in Table 1 , Figure 2 shows not correspond exactly to the product line outputs shown in Table 1 , Figure 2 shows that we match the time-series of securities industry output reasonably well. that we match the time-series of securities industry output reasonably well.
Fees earned from traditional asset management along with administration Fees earned from traditional asset management along with administration costs of pension funds are the largest component of output for the securities costs of pension funds are the largest component of output for the securities industry and are generally an increasing share of output until 1998. We estimate industry and are generally an increasing share of output until 1998. We estimate total fees using assets under management reported by the Investment Company total fees using assets under management reported by the Investment Company Institute (ICI) and percentage fees reported by French (2008) The fees collected by alternative asset managers -hedge funds, private equity The fees collected by alternative asset managers -hedge funds, private equity funds, and venture capital funds -also rose substantially over this period. Most of funds, and venture capital funds -also rose substantially over this period. Most of these funds charge a management fee of 1.5 -2.5 percent of assets under management, these funds charge a management fee of 1.5 -2.5 percent of assets under management, plus "carried interest," a percentage of realized gains in the range of 15-25 percent. plus "carried interest," a percentage of realized gains in the range of 15-25 percent. In most years, the combination of the management fee and carried interest is between In most years, the combination of the management fee and carried interest is between 3 and 5 percent of assets under management, considerably higher than the fees 3 and 5 percent of assets under management, considerably higher than the fees charged by mutual funds. To compute aggregate fees collected by hedge funds, we charged by mutual funds. To compute aggregate fees collected by hedge funds, we apply percentage fees reported in French (2008) Hedge fund, private equity, and venture capital fees were all near-zero in 1990 Hedge fund, private equity, and venture capital fees were all near-zero in 1990 because assets under management were low. However, by 2007, approximately because assets under management were low. However, by 2007, approximately $854 billion of assets was managed by private equity fi rms, $258 billion by venture $854 billion of assets was managed by private equity fi rms, $258 billion by venture capital fi rms, and another $1.46 trillion by US-domiciled hedge funds. Hedge fund capital fi rms, and another $1.46 trillion by US-domiciled hedge funds. Hedge fund fees peaked at $69 billion in 2007. Fees for private equity and venture capital were fees peaked at $69 billion in 2007. Fees for private equity and venture capital were more volatile, spiking in 1999 at $66 billion, driven by a record number of exits in more volatile, spiking in 1999 at $66 billion, driven by a record number of exits in both private equity and venture capital. In 2007, private equity fees were $26 billion both private equity and venture capital. In 2007, private equity fees were $26 billion and venture capital fees were $14 billion. Together, fees for these alternative investand venture capital fees were $14 billion. Together, fees for these alternative investments are comparable to the $91 billion that was collected by mutual fund managers, ments are comparable to the $91 billion that was collected by mutual fund managers, who managed more than fi ve times as many assets. who managed more than fi ve times as many assets.
Our estimates of asset management fees are conservative because we do not Our estimates of asset management fees are conservative because we do not capture growth in fees charged by investment advisors (although these are included capture growth in fees charged by investment advisors (although these are included in the data shown in Table 1 ). These services introduce another layer of fees on top in the data shown in Table 1 ). These services introduce another layer of fees on top of the management fees that go to traditional and alternative investment managers. of the management fees that go to traditional and alternative investment managers. We estimate that these advisors collect at least another $30-$40 billion of revenues We estimate that these advisors collect at least another $30-$40 billion of revenues not refl ected in Figure 2 . not refl ected in Figure 2 . 4 4 Including these fees helps bridge the gap between the Including these fees helps bridge the gap between the combined total of estimated management fees across investment vehicles (from combined total of estimated management fees across investment vehicles (from hedge funds, mutual funds, and so on) and the revenue numbers for asset managehedge funds, mutual funds, and so on) and the revenue numbers for asset management reported by the US Bureau of Economic Analysis in 2007. ment reported by the US Bureau of Economic Analysis in 2007.
Combining the fees paid to traditional and alternative asset managers, the Combining the fees paid to traditional and alternative asset managers, the average fee has fl uctuated between 1.1 and 1.6 percent of assets under manageaverage fee has fl uctuated between 1.1 and 1.6 percent of assets under management, with the exception of 1999, when venture capital exits took the average fee to ment, with the exception of 1999, when venture capital exits took the average fee to 2.3 percent. In 2007, fees were 1.3 percent of assets under management. In short, 2.3 percent. In 2007, fees were 1.3 percent of assets under management. In short, although the composition of asset managers has changed over time-with high although the composition of asset managers has changed over time-with high fee alternative asset managers gaining market share-the average fee paid to the fee alternative asset managers gaining market share-the average fee paid to the industry per dollar of assets under management has not declined. French (2008) industry per dollar of assets under management has not declined. French (2008) reaches this same conclusion. However, our estimates for total fees are higher than reaches this same conclusion. However, our estimates for total fees are higher than those reported by French (2008) because we also include fees earned by US asset those reported by French (2008) because we also include fees earned by US asset managers for assets other than US-listed stocks. managers for assets other than US-listed stocks.
All told, during the period 1980 -2007, total asset management fees grew by All told, during the period 1980 -2007, total asset management fees grew by 2.2 percentage points of GDP, which is over one-third of the growth in fi nancial 2.2 percentage points of GDP, which is over one-third of the growth in fi nancial sector output. By contrast, drawing on data broker-dealers fi le with the Securities sector output. By contrast, drawing on data broker-dealers fi le with the Securities and Exchange Commission, Figure 2 shows that the other main activities of the and Exchange Commission, Figure 2 shows that the other main activities of the securities industry-underwriting, trading, and commissions-do not appear to securities industry-underwriting, trading, and commissions-do not appear to explain a signifi cant share of growth in the securities industry and the fi nancial explain a signifi cant share of growth in the securities industry and the fi nancial sector. sector. 5 5 However, these fi lings do reveal signifi cant growth in a catchall miscellaHowever, these fi lings do reveal signifi cant growth in a catchall miscellaneous category, "other," which showed large growth during the period. Based on neous category, "other," which showed large growth during the period. Based on the BEA and Census Bureau data in Table 1 it is reasonable to infer that the growth the BEA and Census Bureau data in Table 1 it is reasonable to infer that the growth of this category is related to other unmeasured asset management fees (perhaps of this category is related to other unmeasured asset management fees (perhaps advisory fees as described directly above), as well as growth in fi xed-income marketadvisory fees as described directly above), as well as growth in fi xed-income marketmaking and derivatives trading. making and derivatives trading.
Since asset management fees as a percentage of assets did not fl uctuate by Since asset management fees as a percentage of assets did not fl uctuate by much, what then explains the growth in these fees relative to GDP? This growth was much, what then explains the growth in these fees relative to GDP? This growth was driven by two factors: increases in the total outstanding amount of fi nancial assets, driven by two factors: increases in the total outstanding amount of fi nancial assets, and increases in the share of these assets that were professionally managed. We and increases in the share of these assets that were professionally managed. We describe each of these changes below. describe each of these changes below.
The bottom two series in Figure 3 show the value of traded equity and fi xed The bottom two series in Figure 3 show the value of traded equity and fi xed income securities over time, both scaled by GDP, on the left y-axis. Taken together, income securities over time, both scaled by GDP, on the left y-axis. Taken together, these assets increased from 107 percent of GDP in 1980 to 323 percent of GDP by these assets increased from 107 percent of GDP in 1980 to 323 percent of GDP by 2007. The fi gure shows that securities industry output (the dashed line, with values 2007. The fi gure shows that securities industry output (the dashed line, with values read off the right y-axis) closely tracks the total value of these assets. read off the right y-axis) closely tracks the total value of these assets.
In fi xed income, much of the growth came from securitization, whereby assets In fi xed income, much of the growth came from securitization, whereby assets that were once held as illiquid loans on bank balance sheets were pooled into secuthat were once held as illiquid loans on bank balance sheets were pooled into securities that could be traded and managed by professional investors. Fixed income rities that could be traded and managed by professional investors. Fixed income securities grew from 57 percent of GDP in 1980 to 182 percent of GDP in 2007; securities grew from 57 percent of GDP in 1980 to 182 percent of GDP in 2007; approximately 58 percentage points of this growth came from securitization. approximately 58 percentage points of this growth came from securitization. 6 6 In equities, much of the growth came from an increase in valuation ratios. In equities, much of the growth came from an increase in valuation ratios. Figure 3 shows that the value of publicly traded equity relative to GDP tracks the Figure 3 shows that the value of publicly traded equity relative to GDP tracks the market-to-book ratio of the Standard and Poor's 500 (read off the left y-axis). Market market-to-book ratio of the Standard and Poor's 500 (read off the left y-axis). Market capitalization of equities nearly tripled as a share of GDP between 1980 and 2007, capitalization of equities nearly tripled as a share of GDP between 1980 and 2007, growing from 50 percent to 141 percent of GDP. At the same time, the market-to-book growing from 50 percent to 141 percent of GDP. At the same time, the market-to-book ratio of the S&P 500 grew from 1.04 to 2.77 (from 104 to 277 percent on the graph), ratio of the S&P 500 grew from 1.04 to 2.77 (from 104 to 277 percent on the graph), almost entirely explaining the growth. By contrast, the almost entirely explaining the growth. By contrast, the book value of equity of publiclyof equity of publiclytraded fi rms normalized by GDP was essentially fl at during the same period. traded fi rms normalized by GDP was essentially fl at during the same period.
In addition to increases in the amount of fi nancial assets, the share of these In addition to increases in the amount of fi nancial assets, the share of these assets under professional management has also increased. According to the Flow of assets under professional management has also increased. According to the Flow of Funds data from the Federal Reserve, 53 percent of household equity holdings were Funds data from the Federal Reserve, 53 percent of household equity holdings were professionally managed in 2007, compared with only 25 percent in 1980. Lewellen professionally managed in 2007, compared with only 25 percent in 1980. Lewellen (2011) reports that from 1980 to 2007, the share of US common stocks that were (2011) reports that from 1980 to 2007, the share of US common stocks that were held by institutional investors increased from 32 percent to 68 percent of aggregate held by institutional investors increased from 32 percent to 68 percent of aggregate market capitalization. We do not have comparable statistics for the broader universe market capitalization. We do not have comparable statistics for the broader universe of fi xed income assets, but the Flow of Funds suggests similar increases in the share of fi xed income assets, but the Flow of Funds suggests similar increases in the share of these assets that were professionally managed. of these assets that were professionally managed. 7 7 7 For example, direct household holdings of US Treasury bonds fell during this period from 14 percent of outstanding bonds to less than 1 percent.
Figure 3 Tradable Assets and Securities Industry Output
Source: Flow of Funds Accounts of the United States, Bureau of Economic Analysis, and authors' estimates. Notes: Figure 3 show the values of traded equity and of fi xed income securities over time as a percentage of GDP (left axis); the market-to-book ratio of the Standard and Poor's 500 (left axis); and securities industry output as a percentage of GDP (right axis). 
Evaluation of the Growth of Professional Asset Management
The direct cost of professional asset management, at 1.3 percent of assets, is The direct cost of professional asset management, at 1.3 percent of assets, is high. The present value of this fee paid over 30 years amounts to approximately high. The present value of this fee paid over 30 years amounts to approximately one-third of the assets initially invested-a large price to pay a manager who does one-third of the assets initially invested-a large price to pay a manager who does not outperform passive benchmarks. Moreover, paying managers as a percentage of not outperform passive benchmarks. Moreover, paying managers as a percentage of assets under management rewards them when overall asset values rise, even if the assets under management rewards them when overall asset values rise, even if the manager does not outperform. manager does not outperform. 8 8 Indeed, as shown above, asset management fees Indeed, as shown above, asset management fees during the 1980 -2007 period rose in large part because valuation ratios increased. during the 1980 -2007 period rose in large part because valuation ratios increased.
Has society benefi ted from the growth of professional asset management Has society benefi ted from the growth of professional asset management despite these high fees? In the standard competitive model, the growth of an despite these high fees? In the standard competitive model, the growth of an industry would seem to imply increased value to consumers and to society. But in industry would seem to imply increased value to consumers and to society. But in the case of asset management, this implication does not follow immediately because the case of asset management, this implication does not follow immediately because of two important deviations from the competitive benchmark. The fi rst deviation of two important deviations from the competitive benchmark. The fi rst deviation is that most of the potential benefi ts (and some of the costs) of professional asset is that most of the potential benefi ts (and some of the costs) of professional asset management do not accrue directly to users. The second deviation is that many management do not accrue directly to users. The second deviation is that many users have trouble assessing the quality and cost of professional asset management users have trouble assessing the quality and cost of professional asset management services or are infl uenced by agency considerations in choosing and compensating services or are infl uenced by agency considerations in choosing and compensating asset managers. asset managers.
There are two related direct benefi ts of professional asset management: There are two related direct benefi ts of professional asset management: household participation in fi nancial markets and diversifi cation. Mutual funds, for household participation in fi nancial markets and diversifi cation. Mutual funds, for example, enable individuals to buy a basket of securities in one transaction rather example, enable individuals to buy a basket of securities in one transaction rather than construct a portfolio of securities through multiple transactions. Employerthan construct a portfolio of securities through multiple transactions. Employerbased retirement plans also make it easier to participate and diversify. And, as based retirement plans also make it easier to participate and diversify. And, as Gennaioli, Shleifer, and Vishny (2012) point out, professional asset management Gennaioli, Shleifer, and Vishny (2012) point out, professional asset management facilitates participation to the extent that excessively risk-averse individuals trust facilitates participation to the extent that excessively risk-averse individuals trust professional asset managers (rightly or wrongly) to invest their money wisely. professional asset managers (rightly or wrongly) to invest their money wisely.
According to modern fi nance theory, participation and diversifi cation bring According to modern fi nance theory, participation and diversifi cation bring signifi cant direct benefi ts to households. Participating in fi nancial markets enables signifi cant direct benefi ts to households. Participating in fi nancial markets enables individuals to save and to earn a premium from holding risky assets -a premium individuals to save and to earn a premium from holding risky assets -a premium that has historically been very high (Mehra and Prescott 1985) . Diversifying enables that has historically been very high (Mehra and Prescott 1985) . Diversifying enables individuals to more effi ciently bear fi nancial risk. individuals to more effi ciently bear fi nancial risk.
There is evidence that professional asset management has indeed increased There is evidence that professional asset management has indeed increased household participation. In theory, there is a positive externality from an increase in participation and In theory, there is a positive externality from an increase in participation and diversifi cation. Increasing households' willingness and capacity to take market risk diversifi cation. Increasing households' willingness and capacity to take market risk should reduce investors' overall required rates of return. It is therefore possibleshould reduce investors' overall required rates of return. It is therefore possiblebut hard to verify-that the growth of professional asset management was indirectly but hard to verify-that the growth of professional asset management was indirectly
Much of professional asset management, however, is not explicitly directed at Much of professional asset management, however, is not explicitly directed at participation and diversifi cation but rather at beating the market-that is, earning participation and diversifi cation but rather at beating the market-that is, earning excess risk-adjusted returns or "alpha." Here the evidence on mutual fund perforexcess risk-adjusted returns or "alpha." Here the evidence on mutual fund performance strongly indicates that such active management is not directly benefi cial to mance strongly indicates that such active management is not directly benefi cial to investors on average. Most studies document that active investment managers underinvestors on average. Most studies document that active investment managers underperform, especially after taking into account fees. Fama and French (2010) show perform, especially after taking into account fees. Fama and French (2010) show that mutual funds underperform passive benchmarks, even before taking out fees. that mutual funds underperform passive benchmarks, even before taking out fees. Ibbotson, Chen, and Zhu (2011) suggest that hedge funds have produced modest Ibbotson, Chen, and Zhu (2011) suggest that hedge funds have produced modest alpha for their investors, but Jurek and Stafford (2011) point out that there is no alpha for their investors, but Jurek and Stafford (2011) point out that there is no alpha once returns are properly adjusted for tail risk. Of course, in the aggregate, alpha once returns are properly adjusted for tail risk. Of course, in the aggregate, there can be no outperformance of the market on average, since one investor's there can be no outperformance of the market on average, since one investor's positive alpha must be another's negative alpha. Thus, beating the market cannot positive alpha must be another's negative alpha. Thus, beating the market cannot be a direct social benefi t of professional management. be a direct social benefi t of professional management. 9 9 However, from a social benefi t perspective, the critical question is not whether However, from a social benefi t perspective, the critical question is not whether active management leads investors to earn excess returns-it does not. Rather what active management leads investors to earn excess returns-it does not. Rather what matters is whether the matters is whether the pursuit of excess returns produces social benefi ts. One such of excess returns produces social benefi ts. One such benefi t is more accurate ("effi cient") securities prices, which enable fi rms to raise benefi t is more accurate ("effi cient") securities prices, which enable fi rms to raise new capital at prices that better refl ect their fundamental value. If prices are closer new capital at prices that better refl ect their fundamental value. If prices are closer to fundamental value, fi rms have greater incentives to invest in the most productive to fundamental value, fi rms have greater incentives to invest in the most productive projects, and to choose the appropriate scale of investment, thereby improving the projects, and to choose the appropriate scale of investment, thereby improving the economy's overall allocation of capital. One area in which information is particularly economy's overall allocation of capital. One area in which information is particularly valuable is in the funding of start-up fi rms, where uncertainty and information valuable is in the funding of start-up fi rms, where uncertainty and information asymmetries are large. Active asset managers -particularly venture capital fi rms, asymmetries are large. Active asset managers -particularly venture capital fi rms, private equity fi rms, and hedge funds (and to a lesser extent mutual funds)-can private equity fi rms, and hedge funds (and to a lesser extent mutual funds)-can also play a role in monitoring management to make sure that they are taking actions also play a role in monitoring management to make sure that they are taking actions consistent with shareholder value maximization. Indeed, when venture capital fi rms consistent with shareholder value maximization. Indeed, when venture capital fi rms fund new investments they typically have signifi cant control over the fi rm, as do fund new investments they typically have signifi cant control over the fi rm, as do private equity investors involved in leveraged buyouts (Gompers 1995; Kaplan and private equity investors involved in leveraged buyouts (Gompers 1995; Strömberg 2003, 2008 Although it may be Although it may be socially benefi cial for active managers to acquire informabenefi cial for active managers to acquire information and monitor fi rms, it is puzzling that they are able to attract funds despite their tion and monitor fi rms, it is puzzling that they are able to attract funds despite their underperformance. There are few satisfying answers to explain why. The two most underperformance. There are few satisfying answers to explain why. The two most promising explanations stem from a lack of sophistication among households, promising explanations stem from a lack of sophistication among households, along with agency problems at pension funds and other institutional investors. In along with agency problems at pension funds and other institutional investors. In the case of households, there is evidence that many households do not understand the case of households, there is evidence that many households do not understand the fi nancial products they buy (Capon, Fitzsimons, and Prince 1996; Alexander, the fi nancial products they buy (Capon, Fitzsimons, and Prince 1996; Alexander, Jones, and Nigro 1998) or their costs (Choi, Laibson, and Madrian 2010). As a Jones, and Nigro 1998) or their costs (Choi, Laibson, and Madrian 2010). As a result, such households also probably do not understand that it is hard to identify result, such households also probably do not understand that it is hard to identify managers who can consistently generate risk-adjusted excess returns. Gennaioli, managers who can consistently generate risk-adjusted excess returns. Gennaioli, Shleifer, and Vishny (2012) suggest that trust is at least as important for manager Shleifer, and Vishny (2012) suggest that trust is at least as important for manager selection as the desire for outperformance. selection as the desire for outperformance.
In the case of institutions, pension fund and endowment managers are more In the case of institutions, pension fund and endowment managers are more sophisticated than households, and some of these institutions have been able to sophisticated than households, and some of these institutions have been able to earn high returns through their use of high-fee alternative managers (Swensen earn high returns through their use of high-fee alternative managers (Swensen 2000) . However, agency problems appear to have led the vast majority of institu-2000). However, agency problems appear to have led the vast majority of institutions to overpay for active management. Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1992) tions to overpay for active management. Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1992) show that institutional managers underperform the Standard and Poor's 500 by show that institutional managers underperform the Standard and Poor's 500 by 2.6 percentage points per year, which they attribute to agency problems. 2.6 percentage points per year, which they attribute to agency problems. 10 10 Goyal Goyal and Wahal (2008) show that investment management fi rms hired by pension plan and Wahal (2008) show that investment management fi rms hired by pension plan sponsors typically underperform when compared to investment management fi rms sponsors typically underperform when compared to investment management fi rms that were recently terminated by the same sponsors. Novy-Marx and Rauh (2009) that were recently terminated by the same sponsors. Novy-Marx and Rauh (2009) point out that public pension funds have incentives to invest in riskier asset classes point out that public pension funds have incentives to invest in riskier asset classes because this enables them to report higher return forecasts and thereby discount because this enables them to report higher return forecasts and thereby discount reported liabilities at a higher rate. And many institutions seek advice from banks reported liabilities at a higher rate. And many institutions seek advice from banks and investment advisors, which typically recommend private equity investments that and investment advisors, which typically recommend private equity investments that subsequently underperform (Lerner, Schoar, and Wongsunwai 2007). subsequently underperform (Lerner, Schoar, and Wongsunwai 2007).
One could argue that the behavior of unsophisticated and agency-prone One could argue that the behavior of unsophisticated and agency-prone investors generates a positive externality: there are surely more resources spent investors generates a positive externality: there are surely more resources spent gathering information and monitoring managers than there would be in a world in gathering information and monitoring managers than there would be in a world in which investors refused to overpay for active asset management. Absent investors' which investors refused to overpay for active asset management. Absent investors' willingness to overpay, equilibrium securities prices could have less than the socially willingness to overpay, equilibrium securities prices could have less than the socially effi cient amount of information, and corporate managers would be subject to insufeffi cient amount of information, and corporate managers would be subject to insuffi cient monitoring. For example, venture capital funding of start-up fi rms, which fi cient monitoring. For example, venture capital funding of start-up fi rms, which has arguably brought signifi cant positive externalities, would have been less robust has arguably brought signifi cant positive externalities, would have been less robust if investors in venture capital funds had required adequate compensation for the if investors in venture capital funds had required adequate compensation for the risks they were taking. risks they were taking.
While one could make this sort of argument, it is not entirely convincing. One While one could make this sort of argument, it is not entirely convincing. One important reason is that not all information collection performed by active asset important reason is that not all information collection performed by active asset managers is socially valuable. For example, a hedge fund may be willing to pay managers is socially valuable. For example, a hedge fund may be willing to pay $20,000 to form a more accurate prediction of a company's earnings to be released $20,000 to form a more accurate prediction of a company's earnings to be released in the next week. To the extent that this information allows the hedge fund to in the next week. To the extent that this information allows the hedge fund to profi t at the expense of other less-informed market participants, the fund earns an profi t at the expense of other less-informed market participants, the fund earns an excess return. Hirshleifer (1971) calls information of this type "foreknowledge," excess return. Hirshleifer (1971) calls information of this type "foreknowledge," but explains that it has no social value. More specifi cally, the $20,000 expenditure but explains that it has no social value. More specifi cally, the $20,000 expenditure should be regarded as a social loss because getting this information into prices should be regarded as a social loss because getting this information into prices one week earlier is unlikely to lead to a more effi cient allocation of real resources. one week earlier is unlikely to lead to a more effi cient allocation of real resources. Modern fi nancial markets are rife with examples of such socially wasteful investModern fi nancial markets are rife with examples of such socially wasteful investments. For example, consider the costs of "co-location hosting services," which ments. For example, consider the costs of "co-location hosting services," which enable electronic orders to arrive milliseconds faster because of their geographical enable electronic orders to arrive milliseconds faster because of their geographical proximity to trading centers. These investments lend support to Paul Samuelson's proximity to trading centers. These investments lend support to Paul Samuelson's view, originally cited in Shiller (2001, p. 243), that modern fi nancial markets display view, originally cited in Shiller (2001, p. 243), that modern fi nancial markets display "considerable micro effi ciency"-perhaps facilitated by active asset management-"considerable micro effi ciency"-perhaps facilitated by active asset managementwhile at the same time retaining large "macro ineffi ciency." We fi nd it noteworthy while at the same time retaining large "macro ineffi ciency." We fi nd it noteworthy that over the last 15 years, despite increased resources devoted to asset managethat over the last 15 years, despite increased resources devoted to asset management, there have been two large and socially costly valuation errors: the Internet ment, there have been two large and socially costly valuation errors: the Internet bubble at the end of the 1990s and the overvaluation of mortgage-backed securities bubble at the end of the 1990s and the overvaluation of mortgage-backed securities during the 2000s. during the 2000s.
Another reason to question the social benefi ts of information production by Another reason to question the social benefi ts of information production by active managers is the evidence that they cater to the preferences of unsophistiactive managers is the evidence that they cater to the preferences of unsophisticated investors. For example, mutual fund managers channel investor fl ows into the cated investors. For example, mutual fund managers channel investor fl ows into the sorts of securities that investors want to own (say, Internet stocks at certain times, sorts of securities that investors want to own (say, Internet stocks at certain times, high-yield bonds at other times, and so on) rather than allocating capital to its best high-yield bonds at other times, and so on) rather than allocating capital to its best use (Frazzini and Lamont 2008 Finally, when investors overpay for active management, it creates rents in the Finally, when investors overpay for active management, it creates rents in the sector. These rents lure talented individuals away from potentially more productive sector. These rents lure talented individuals away from potentially more productive sectors (Baumol 1990; Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny 1991). sectors (Baumol 1990 ; Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny 1991). 12 12 Indeed, during the Indeed, during the period of rapid growth in asset management, fi nance attracted more talent, at least period of rapid growth in asset management, fi nance attracted more talent, at least as measured by the number of students entering fi nance from elite universities. The as measured by the number of students entering fi nance from elite universities. The cost of this reallocation of talent depends, in large measure, on the industries that cost of this reallocation of talent depends, in large measure, on the industries that top students would have otherwise entered and the marginal value of additional top students would have otherwise entered and the marginal value of additional talent entering fi nance. If, for example, students shifted into fi nance from science talent entering fi nance. If, for example, students shifted into fi nance from science and engineering, where rents are low and marginal productivity potentially higher, and engineering, where rents are low and marginal productivity potentially higher, then the talent reallocation is costly to society. By contrast, the social costs are much then the talent reallocation is costly to society. By contrast, the social costs are much lower if the marginal entrant into fi nance would have otherwise sought a career lower if the marginal entrant into fi nance would have otherwise sought a career in other rent-seeking sectors, such as parts of legal services. In a recent study of in other rent-seeking sectors, such as parts of legal services. In a recent study of MIT undergraduates, Shu (2013) shows that fi nance attracts the best students, as MIT undergraduates, Shu (2013) shows that fi nance attracts the best students, as measured by their characteristics at the time of admission. measured by their characteristics at the time of admission. 13 13 The Growth of Credit Intermediation
Components of Growth
As illustrated in Figure 1 , the credit intermediation industry (as defi ned by the As illustrated in Figure 1 , the credit intermediation industry (as defi ned by the BEA) grew on a value-added basis from 2. The growth of credit intermediation accounted for roughly one-quarter of the growth in the fi nancial sector, which ation accounted for roughly one-quarter of the growth in the fi nancial sector, which is less than the contribution of the securities industry to fi nancial sector growth and is less than the contribution of the securities industry to fi nancial sector growth and about equal to that of the insurance industry. about equal to that of the insurance industry.
As with the securities industry, we examine in more detail the activities that As with the securities industry, we examine in more detail the activities that drove the growth of credit intermediation. Again due to data limitations, we look drove the growth of credit intermediation. Again due to data limitations, we look at the output of these activities rather than their value-added. Table 2 , using data at the output of these activities rather than their value-added. Table 2 , using data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis and Economic Census, breaks out credit from the Bureau of Economic Analysis and Economic Census, breaks out credit intermediation into its main components: intermediation into its main components: traditional banking (lending and deposit-(lending and deposittaking) and taking) and transactional services related to credit card accounts, deposit accounts, related to credit card accounts, deposit accounts, ATM usage, and loan origination. The distinction between these broad categories ATM usage, and loan origination. The distinction between these broad categories is admittedly imprecise. is admittedly imprecise.
The output from transactional services is simply measured as the fees collected The output from transactional services is simply measured as the fees collected for these services. Measuring the output from traditional banking, which is divided for these services. Measuring the output from traditional banking, which is divided into lending and deposit-taking, is more complex. The output from lending is into lending and deposit-taking, is more complex. The output from lending is imputed as the difference between the interest earned on bank loans (that is, loans imputed as the difference between the interest earned on bank loans (that is, loans on bank balance sheets including commercial, consumer, and real-estate loans) on bank balance sheets including commercial, consumer, and real-estate loans) and the interest that would have been earned, had the funds been invested in and the interest that would have been earned, had the funds been invested in Treasury and Agency securities (those guaranteed by government agencies such Treasury and Agency securities (those guaranteed by government agencies such as the Federal Housing Administration or government-sponsored enterprises such as the Federal Housing Administration or government-sponsored enterprises such as Fannie Mae). These calculations use the average interest rate earned on banks' as Fannie Mae). These calculations use the average interest rate earned on banks' holdings of these securities: that is, holdings of these securities: that is, Lending Output = = Bank Loans × × ( (Interest Rate on Loans --Interest Rate on Treasury and Agency Securities). This is meant to capture ). This is meant to capture the ongoing services provided by banks in managing and monitoring loans on the ongoing services provided by banks in managing and monitoring loans on their balance sheets, as well as the value of identifying the loans in the fi rst place. their balance sheets, as well as the value of identifying the loans in the fi rst place. However, this basic measure could overstate or understate the value of these services. However, this basic measure could overstate or understate the value of these services. It overstates the value to the extent that it also includes the credit risk and maturity It overstates the value to the extent that it also includes the credit risk and maturity premium that banks (or any other investors) earn by holding risky long-term loans premium that banks (or any other investors) earn by holding risky long-term loans (Ashcraft and Steindel 2008) . The measure could understate the value of these (Ashcraft and Steindel 2008) . The measure could understate the value of these services to the extent that the fees associated with loan origination are included in services to the extent that the fees associated with loan origination are included in our transactional services category. our transactional services category. The imputed output from deposit-taking is measured as the quantity of The imputed output from deposit-taking is measured as the quantity of deposits multiplied by the difference between the rate earned on Treasury and deposits multiplied by the difference between the rate earned on Treasury and Agency securities and the rate paid on those deposits; that is, Agency securities and the rate paid on those deposits; that is, Deposit Services Output = = Deposits × × (Treasury Interest Rate --Average Interest Rate Paid to Depositors). . Depositors presumably accept yields below those of US Treasuries and equivalent Depositors presumably accept yields below those of US Treasuries and equivalent government guaranteed securities because they use deposits for transactional government guaranteed securities because they use deposits for transactional purposes. purposes. Table 2 shows that the output from traditional banking as a percentage of GDP Table 2 shows that the output from traditional banking as a percentage of GDP was roughly the same in 2007 as it was in 1997. However, substantial growth occurred was roughly the same in 2007 as it was in 1997. However, substantial growth occurred in transactional services, which in turn were largely refl ected in fees associated with in transactional services, which in turn were largely refl ected in fees associated with deposits, residential loan origination, and the catchall category of "other products deposits, residential loan origination, and the catchall category of "other products supporting fi nancial services." In 2002, in particular, residential loan origination supporting fi nancial services." In 2002, in particular, residential loan origination fees spiked as part of the largest mortgage-refi nancing wave in US history. These fees spiked as part of the largest mortgage-refi nancing wave in US history. These fees totaled $76.8 billion-0.7 percent of GDP, or 2.7 percent of the $2.85 trillion of fees totaled $76.8 billion-0.7 percent of GDP, or 2.7 percent of the $2.85 trillion of residential mortgages issued in that year. residential mortgages issued in that year.
As in the previous section, we form our own estimates of the sector's outputs As in the previous section, we form our own estimates of the sector's outputs going back to 1980. Here, we follow the methodology of the Bureau of Economic going back to 1980. Here, we follow the methodology of the Bureau of Economic Analysis and use data from the Call Reports, which all regulated fi nancial instituAnalysis and use data from the Call Reports, which all regulated fi nancial institutions must submit to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation at the end of each tions must submit to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation at the end of each quarter. As a consistency check, we verify that we can replicate the total output quarter. As a consistency check, we verify that we can replicate the total output numbers in the years in which the Economic Census is carried out (that is, every numbers in the years in which the Economic Census is carried out (that is, every fi ve years starting in 1982). fi ve years starting in 1982). 14 14 As can be seen from Figure 4 , imputed output from lending as a share of GDP As can be seen from Figure 4 , imputed output from lending as a share of GDP has fl uctuated around its mean of 1.2 percent of GDP. Much of the variation comes has fl uctuated around its mean of 1.2 percent of GDP. Much of the variation comes from changes in the ratio of bank loans to GDP, which fell from about 60 percent from changes in the ratio of bank loans to GDP, which fell from about 60 percent at the end of the 1980s to under 50 percent at the end of 1990s. Figure 4 also shows that output from deposit-taking has generally been falling over time. Some of the decline stems from reductions in spreads between securities over time. Some of the decline stems from reductions in spreads between securities and deposits, but the main source of the decline is a reduction in deposits relative and deposits, but the main source of the decline is a reduction in deposits relative to GDP, from its peak of about 70 percent at the beginning of the 1980s to under to GDP, from its peak of about 70 percent at the beginning of the 1980s to under 50 percent in the early 2000s. This decline mostly refl ects a shift of saving into money 50 percent in the early 2000s. This decline mostly refl ects a shift of saving into money market funds, bond funds, and the stock market. While traditional banking has market funds, bond funds, and the stock market. While traditional banking has declined slightly as a share of GDP, Figure 4 illustrates that essentially all of the growth declined slightly as a share of GDP, Figure 4 illustrates that essentially all of the growth in the credit intermediation industry has come from transactional services, largely in the credit intermediation industry has come from transactional services, largely refl ected in fees associated with consumer and mortgage credit. A sizable share of the refl ected in fees associated with consumer and mortgage credit. A sizable share of the fees can be traced to the refi nancing of existing mortgages. Mortgage origination, in fees can be traced to the refi nancing of existing mortgages. Mortgage origination, in turn, is highly dependent on the path of nominal interest rates, which were falling for turn, is highly dependent on the path of nominal interest rates, which were falling for most of the period we study here and led to extraordinarily high levels of refi nancing most of the period we study here and led to extraordinarily high levels of refi nancing for a number of years during the period. for a number of years during the period. All of the incremental growth in household credit as ning and end of the period. All of the incremental growth in household credit as a share of GDP was securitized. That is, instead of banks holding the additional a share of GDP was securitized. That is, instead of banks holding the additional mortgages and consumer loans directly on their balance sheets, these loans were mortgages and consumer loans directly on their balance sheets, these loans were packaged into asset-backed securities. Indeed, as early as 1995, more than half of all packaged into asset-backed securities. Indeed, as early as 1995, more than half of all outstanding single-family mortgages and a sizeable share of commercial mortgages outstanding single-family mortgages and a sizeable share of commercial mortgages and consumer credit were securitized. and consumer credit were securitized.
The growing importance of securitization during the period is not refl ected The growing importance of securitization during the period is not refl ected in the Bureau of Economic Analysis measure of output from lending; if a loan is in the Bureau of Economic Analysis measure of output from lending; if a loan is securitized, the interest rate spread is not included in the measure. If instead we securitized, the interest rate spread is not included in the measure. If instead we incorporate asset-backed securities in the measure by assigning them the same incorporate asset-backed securities in the measure by assigning them the same interest rate spread as loans on bank balance sheets, we estimate that imputed interest rate spread as loans on bank balance sheets, we estimate that imputed output from lending would have been approximately 0. It is diffi cult to know whether securitization was driven by an increased It is diffi cult to know whether securitization was driven by an increased demand for credit by households and fi rms, or by an increase in supply stemming demand for credit by households and fi rms, or by an increase in supply stemming from changes in technology that allowed for easier administration of large pools from changes in technology that allowed for easier administration of large pools of securities or lax regulation. Regardless of the cause, securitization surely faciliof securities or lax regulation. Regardless of the cause, securitization surely facilitated the growth of credit. Importantly, securitization also went hand-in-hand with tated the growth of credit. Importantly, securitization also went hand-in-hand with the growth of "shadow banking," in which key functions of traditional banking the growth of "shadow banking," in which key functions of traditional banking are provided by a host of nonbank fi nancial entities (though often in conjuncare provided by a host of nonbank fi nancial entities (though often in conjunction with traditional banks). Pozsar, Adrian, Ashcraft, and Boesky (2010) defi ne tion with traditional banks). Pozsar, Adrian, Ashcraft, and Boesky (2010) defi ne shadow banks as "fi nancial intermediaries that conduct maturity, credit, and shadow banks as "fi nancial intermediaries that conduct maturity, credit, and liquidity transformation without explicit access to central bank liquidity or public liquidity transformation without explicit access to central bank liquidity or public sector credit guarantees." Like banks, these entities issue short-term, liquid claims sector credit guarantees." Like banks, these entities issue short-term, liquid claims and hold longer-term, riskier, and less-liquid assets. But unlike banks, they cannot and hold longer-term, riskier, and less-liquid assets. But unlike banks, they cannot issue insured deposits and do not have guaranteed access to the Federal Reserve's issue insured deposits and do not have guaranteed access to the Federal Reserve's lender-of-last-resort credit facilities. Examples of shadow banks include struclender-of-last-resort credit facilities. Examples of shadow banks include structured investment vehicles that hold loans and asset-backed securities while being tured investment vehicles that hold loans and asset-backed securities while being funded with short-term asset-backed commercial paper. Money market funds are funded with short-term asset-backed commercial paper. Money market funds are also shadow banks; they issue short-term claims and hold somewhat longer-term also shadow banks; they issue short-term claims and hold somewhat longer-term securities. And the government-sponsored entities like Fannie Mae and Freddie securities. And the government-sponsored entities like Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac hold mortgages and mortgage-backed securities, funded, in part, by issuing Mac hold mortgages and mortgage-backed securities, funded, in part, by issuing short-term debt instruments. Figure 5 shows that short-term instruments typically short-term debt instruments. Figure 5 shows that short-term instruments typically associated with the shadow banking sector-including repurchase agreements associated with the shadow banking sector-including repurchase agreements (which are effectively secured loans and are often called "repo"), money market (which are effectively secured loans and are often called "repo"), money market funds, and commercial paper-rose signifi cantly as a share of GDP. funds, and commercial paper-rose signifi cantly as a share of GDP.
Shadow banking institutions do not operate in isolation, but rather are Shadow banking institutions do not operate in isolation, but rather are connected to each other in the credit intermediation process. For example, money connected to each other in the credit intermediation process. For example, money market funds hold asset-backed commercial paper, which itself holds asset-backed market funds hold asset-backed commercial paper, which itself holds asset-backed securities comprised of loans that are sometimes guaranteed by other entities. securities comprised of loans that are sometimes guaranteed by other entities. As noted by Adrian and Shin (2010) and others, shadow banking has increased As noted by Adrian and Shin (2010) and others, shadow banking has increased the number of interconnected steps in the credit intermediation process. Combined the number of interconnected steps in the credit intermediation process. Combined with short-term leverage, this new approach to banking may have increased fi nanwith short-term leverage, this new approach to banking may have increased fi nancial system fragility. We attempt to measure the increase in the number of credit cial system fragility. We attempt to measure the increase in the number of credit intermediation steps with a summary statistic, which we call the Credit Intermediaintermediation steps with a summary statistic, which we call the Credit Intermediation Index. This measure seeks to estimate the average number of steps a dollar tion Index. This measure seeks to estimate the average number of steps a dollar takes as it passes from households to the fi nal end-users, with data from the Flow takes as it passes from households to the fi nal end-users, with data from the Flow of Funds of Funds accounts. For example, when a household makes a direct loan to a busiaccounts. For example, when a household makes a direct loan to a business, this direct fi nance involves one step. If a household deposits funds in a bank, ness, this direct fi nance involves one step. If a household deposits funds in a bank, which then makes a loan directly to a business, there are two intermediation steps. which then makes a loan directly to a business, there are two intermediation steps. More broadly, the ratio of total liabilities (including those of the fi nancial sector More broadly, the ratio of total liabilities (including those of the fi nancial sector which is not an end-user of credit) to liabilities of the household, government, and which is not an end-user of credit) to liabilities of the household, government, and nonfi nancial business sectors (which are end-users of credit) is mathematically nonfi nancial business sectors (which are end-users of credit) is mathematically equivalent to the expected number of intermediation steps taken by a dollar on the equivalent to the expected number of intermediation steps taken by a dollar on the way to its end-user. Thus, the Credit Intermediation Index is defi ned as: way to its end-user. Thus, the Credit Intermediation Index is defi ned as:
Credit Intermediation Index = (Total Liabilities of All Sectors)/(Total End-User Liabilities).
Financial sector liabilities, which are a key component of the numerator, include the liabilities of the banking sector: deposits, commercial paper, long-term debt, and repo. They also include money market fund assets, debt of the governmentsponsored entities, mortgage pools of the government-sponsored entities, private asset-backed-securities, and the investments of pension funds and mutual funds in credit instruments. 15 The fi nancial sector liabilities that experienced the largest growth are asset-backed securities, borrowing by government-sponsored entities like Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and government-sponsored entity pools.
Our Credit Intermediation Index captures the increasing number of steps Our Credit Intermediation Index captures the increasing number of steps involved in credit creation as shown in Figure 6 , with most of the increase occurring involved in credit creation as shown in Figure 6 , with most of the increase occurring during the 1990s. during the 1990s. 16 16 This increase is related to the growth of securitization because This increase is related to the growth of securitization because most asset-backed securities are held by fi nancial intermediaries rather than by most asset-backed securities are held by fi nancial intermediaries rather than by households directly. For example, in 2007 approximately 73 percent of outstanding households directly. For example, in 2007 approximately 73 percent of outstanding mortgage-backed securities were held by fi nancial intermediaries, including commermortgage-backed securities were held by fi nancial intermediaries, including commercial banks (15 percent), government-sponsored entities (16 percent), and mutual cial banks (15 percent), government-sponsored entities (16 percent), and mutual funds (11 percent). These intermediaries, in turn, often fund their purchases of funds (11 percent). These intermediaries, in turn, often fund their purchases of mortgage-backed securities with debt, thereby increasing the number of steps in mortgage-backed securities with debt, thereby increasing the number of steps in credit intermediation. credit intermediation.
Evaluation of the Growth of Credit Intermediation
A sizable share of the growth of the fi nancial sector can be attributed to the A sizable share of the growth of the fi nancial sector can be attributed to the growth in household credit. This growth was likely facilitated by the advent of growth in household credit. This growth was likely facilitated by the advent of shadow banking, which expanded the supply of credit to a wider set of households. shadow banking, which expanded the supply of credit to a wider set of households. As noted above, shadow banking also brought fundamental changes in the way As noted above, shadow banking also brought fundamental changes in the way credit is delivered. credit is delivered. 15 We are including securitizations in fi nancial sector liabilities. While one could argue that these securities are a form of direct fi nance like a corporate bond, they rely much more heavily on the ongoing involvement of a variety of fi nancial intermediaries than would a corporate bond. For example, mortgage pools created by the government-sponsored entities like Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac receive a credit guarantee from those entities. Other asset-backed securities require servicers and collateral managers to make payments to bondholders, deal with defaulted loans, ensure that covenants are not violated, and in some cases move collateral in and out of the securitization vehicle. 16 As constructed, however, this Credit Intermediation Index understates the steps in of the credit intermediation process for a variety of reasons including: our inability to measure intrasector intermediation activity; ignoring approximately $15 trillion of credit derivatives, which transfer risk in the credit inter mediation process; understating repos from nonbank entities; and omitting key steps in the credit intermediation chain such as origination by mortgage brokers and mortgage insurance.
It is tempting to argue that society must be better off if, by lowering costs, It is tempting to argue that society must be better off if, by lowering costs, fi nancial innovation expands the supply of credit and households choose to borrow fi nancial innovation expands the supply of credit and households choose to borrow more. In the standard competitive model, expanding supply is welfare enhancing. more. In the standard competitive model, expanding supply is welfare enhancing. But, as in our discussion of asset management, a number of considerations suggest But, as in our discussion of asset management, a number of considerations suggest that this logic is incomplete. that this logic is incomplete.
First, while credit can play an important role in enabling households to smooth First, while credit can play an important role in enabling households to smooth consumption and fund investments, it can also lead to excessive consumption. consumption and fund investments, it can also lead to excessive consumption. Laibson (1997) shows that when individuals have self-control problems -which he Laibson (1997) shows that when individuals have self-control problems -which he models with a hyperbolic discount rate-then fi nancial innovation that increases models with a hyperbolic discount rate-then fi nancial innovation that increases the availability of credit can make these individuals worse off. The steep increase the availability of credit can make these individuals worse off. The steep increase in indebtedness of many low-and moderate-income households above sustainable in indebtedness of many low-and moderate-income households above sustainable levels arguably made many of these households worse off. Many houses fi nanced levels arguably made many of these households worse off. Second, much of the growth in household credit took the form of an increase Second, much of the growth in household credit took the form of an increase in mortgage debt. As is well known, the US tax code already biases households in mortgage debt. As is well known, the US tax code already biases households towards investments in housing over other types of investments (Sinai and Gyourko towards investments in housing over other types of investments Third, an increase in household indebtedness may have adverse consequences Third, an increase in household indebtedness may have adverse consequences for macroeconomic stability. For example, Lamont and Stein (1999) show that for macroeconomic stability. For example, Lamont and Stein (1999) show that household leverage increases house price volatility. Mian and Sufi (2012) show household leverage increases house price volatility. Mian and Sufi (2012) show that greater availability of mortgage credit led to large increases in durables that greater availability of mortgage credit led to large increases in durables consumption, followed by large decreases in consumption when house prices fell consumption, followed by large decreases in consumption when house prices fell during the fi nancial crisis. Households do not take these macroeconomic externaliduring the fi nancial crisis. Households do not take these macroeconomic externalities into account when they choose how much to borrow. ties into account when they choose how much to borrow.
Finally, as noted above, the growth of household credit went hand-in-hand with Finally, as noted above, the growth of household credit went hand-in-hand with the growth of shadow banking. While shadow banking offers a number of theothe growth of shadow banking. While shadow banking offers a number of theoretical benefi ts -like greater liquidity and the sharing of risk across the fi nancial retical benefi ts -like greater liquidity and the sharing of risk across the fi nancial system-the fi nancial crisis revealed signifi cant fi nancial stability costs of shadow system-the fi nancial crisis revealed signifi cant fi nancial stability costs of shadow banking. As noted above, these costs stem from the issuance of short-term fi nancial banking. As noted above, these costs stem from the issuance of short-term fi nancial claims without explicit government guarantees by entities that do not have access to claims without explicit government guarantees by entities that do not have access to the Federal Reserve's lender-of-last-resort facilities, which in turn exposes these entithe Federal Reserve's lender-of-last-resort facilities, which in turn exposes these entities to runs when investors become concerned about the entities' solvency (Gorton ties to runs when investors become concerned about the entities' solvency (Gorton and Metrick 2011). As Stein (2012) argues, market participants do not internalize and Metrick 2011). As Stein (2012) argues, market participants do not internalize the full cost that the possibility of these runs may impose on the fi nancial system, the full cost that the possibility of these runs may impose on the fi nancial system, resulting in socially excessive issuance of short-term claims. Shadow banking may resulting in socially excessive issuance of short-term claims. Shadow banking may have also reduced the stability of the fi nancial system by increasing the number of have also reduced the stability of the fi nancial system by increasing the number of steps in the credit intermediation process, which makes it harder for market particisteps in the credit intermediation process, which makes it harder for market participants to understand the risk exposures of their counterparties. Separating credit pants to understand the risk exposures of their counterparties. Separating credit intermediation into distinct components can provide benefi ts like intermediary intermediation into distinct components can provide benefi ts like intermediary specialization and more liquid fi nancial markets during ordinary times. However, specialization and more liquid fi nancial markets during ordinary times. However, market participants are unlikely to internalize the impact of a longer intermediamarket participants are unlikely to internalize the impact of a longer intermediation chain on fi nancial stability. tion chain on fi nancial stability.
Conclusions
Our objective in this paper has been to understand the activities that contribOur objective in this paper has been to understand the activities that contributed to the growth of fi nance between 1980 and 2007, and to provide a preliminary uted to the growth of fi nance between 1980 and 2007, and to provide a preliminary assessment of whether and in what ways society benefi ted from this growth. assessment of whether and in what ways society benefi ted from this growth.
One large part of the growth of fi nance is asset management, which faciliOne large part of the growth of fi nance is asset management, which facilitated increased diversifi cation and household participation in securities markets. tated increased diversifi cation and household participation in securities markets. As a result, it is likely that required rates of return on risky securities have fallen, As a result, it is likely that required rates of return on risky securities have fallen, valuations have risen, and the cost of capital to corporations has decreased. The valuations have risen, and the cost of capital to corporations has decreased. The biggest benefi ciaries were likely young fi rms. On the other hand, asset management biggest benefi ciaries were likely young fi rms. On the other hand, asset management has been very costly. While some amount of active asset management is necessary has been very costly. While some amount of active asset management is necessary for informational effi ciency and adequate monitoring, there are many reasons to for informational effi ciency and adequate monitoring, there are many reasons to believe that there is too much of it on the margin. believe that there is too much of it on the margin.
The other major source of growth in the fi nancial sector was in credit intermeThe other major source of growth in the fi nancial sector was in credit intermediation. Financial innovation changed the process of credit delivery in a way that diation. Financial innovation changed the process of credit delivery in a way that especially facilitated the expansion of household credit, mainly residential mortgage especially facilitated the expansion of household credit, mainly residential mortgage credit. While there may be benefi ts of expanding access to mortgage credit, there credit. While there may be benefi ts of expanding access to mortgage credit, there are a number of societal costs from such an expansion, including instability from are a number of societal costs from such an expansion, including instability from excessive household leverage. Moreover, the shadow banking system that facilitated excessive household leverage. Moreover, the shadow banking system that facilitated this expansion made the fi nancial system more fragile. This runs counter to the this expansion made the fi nancial system more fragile. This runs counter to the traditional "functional" view of fi nance, which suggests that a primary function of traditional "functional" view of fi nance, which suggests that a primary function of the fi nancial sector is to dampen the effects of risk by reallocating it effi ciently to the fi nancial sector is to dampen the effects of risk by reallocating it effi ciently to parties that can bear risks the most easily (Merton and Bodie 1995) . In evaluating parties that can bear risks the most easily (Merton and Bodie 1995) . In evaluating the implications of the growth of the fi nancial sector, such concerns need to be the implications of the growth of the fi nancial sector, such concerns need to be weighed against the many benefi ts that we have identifi ed. weighed against the many benefi ts that we have identifi ed.
